China’s Military Growth: Naval Expansion, Cyber Warfare, and Nuclear Capabilities
Taiwan’s Countermeasures: Strengthening Defense, Research Security, and Cyber Resilience
The Future of Security in the Taiwan Strait: Global Implications and Strategic Challenges

China’s Military Growth: Naval Expansion, Cyber Warfare, and Nuclear Capabilities

The People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has expanded its operational reach beyond East Asia, as China's military has undertaken rapid modernization.  In its most recent evaluation of Beijing's military capabilities, the Pentagon has identified a consistent Chinese naval presence in the Gulf of Aden, which suggests a transition to the projection of global power.  China's officer corps, which continues to grapple with battlefield assessments, strategic decision-making, and military deployment, is plagued by personnel quality issues, despite its possession of the world's largest navy.

China has also enhanced its nuclear capabilities, with a projected increase in its warhead stockpile from 600 to 1,000 by 2030.  The nation currently maintains a fully operational nuclear triad, which enables it to execute nuclear assaults by means of six nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines, a modernized strategic bomber force, and land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs).  Nevertheless, Beijing's refusal to participate in arms control negotiations contributes to strategic instability.

According to Taiwan's National Security Bureau (NSB), China has ramped up its cyber operations against Taiwan, with the number of intrusions doubling from 1.2 million per day in 2023 to 2.4 million per day in 2024, in addition to conventional military threats.  The primary objectives are to erode Taiwan's capacity to function in the event of a conflict by targeting government agencies, telecommunications firms, and critical infrastructure.  Additionally, Chinese hacking organizations have acquired access to U.S. federal surveillance systems, which has prompted apprehensions regarding global espionage and mass data collection.

China has also intensified its influence operations in academic research, leveraging global partnerships to acquire essential technological expertise.  Taiwan's Ministry of Education (MoE) has implemented stringent measures to prevent research security violations in response to reports that Chinese military-affiliated universities are strengthening their relationships with Russian institutions.  These collaborations present substantial risks, as Chinese institutions affiliated with military programs frequently participate in technology transfers that provide support to the People's Liberation Army (PLA).

Taiwan’s Countermeasures: Strengthening Defense, Research Security, and Cyber Resilienc

In an effort to fortify the nation's resilience, Taiwan has implemented defense strategies that encompass the entire society.  The Whole-of-Society Defense Resilience (WOSDR) Committee, which is under the Presidential Office and meets quarterly, has been established by President Lai Ching-te's administration to emphasize military preparedness.  The initiative is founded on five fundamental components:

• Training and mobilization of the civilian force
• Supply chain security and strategic material preparation
• Energy and infrastructure security
• Emergency response readiness and medical care
• Financial network protection and cybersecurity.

Moreover, Taiwan has increased its defense budget, despite the fact that political opposition has resulted in $6.32 billion in cutbacks. These cuts have impacted critical projects, including submarine development and training programs for overseas military personnel.  President Lai maintained his commitment to increasing the defense budget to over 3% of GDP in order to mitigate China's growing threat, despite the obstacles.

To further protect its national security, Taiwan has implemented stringent research security measures that are designed to counteract China's influence in academic institutions.  In February 2025, the Ministry of Education (MoE) of Taiwan issued a directive to universities to discontinue exchanges with institutions affiliated with the United Front Work Department (UFWD), a branch of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) that is responsible for political influence abroad.  The following universities are included:

• Jinan University (Guangdong Province) – A key institution under China’s Project 211.
• Huaqiao University (Fujian Province) – Formerly focused on overseas Chinese students, now controlled by UFWD.
• Beijing Chinese Language and Culture College – Suspected of advancing CCP political objectives.

Furthermore, Taiwan has prohibited academic partnerships with the Seven Sons of National Defense, a consortium of seven Chinese universities that are affiliated with the military and are involved in the development of defense technology and research. Beihang University, Beijing Institute of Technology, Northwestern Polytechnical University, and Harbin Institute of Technology are among the institutions in question. These prohibitions are consistent with global countermeasures, as the U.S. Department of Justice and Department of Commerce have sanctioned 18 Chinese universities, including the Seven Sons, in order to prevent technology theft.  Additionally, European nations such as Switzerland (ETH Zurich) and Japan have implemented more stringent screening procedures for students and researchers affiliated with the Chinese military. Additionally, China has been actively recruiting Taiwanese semiconductor professionals, particularly from TSMC, the nation's foremost chip manufacturer.  A China-funded office at National Tsing Hua University was purportedly used as a recruitment center for China's struggling semiconductor industry. In 2021, Taiwan's Ministry of Education (MoE) closed the office.  China has also been recruiting global engineering talent and laid-off U.S. researchers to enhance its self-sufficiency in advanced technology

The Future of Security in the Taiwan Strait: Global Implications and Strategic Challenges

The challenge of deterring China remains complex, despite Taiwan's progress in military preparedness, cybersecurity, and research security.  Pentagon analysts maintain that China is not yet capable of conducting a full-scale amphibious assault, despite Xi Jinping's explicit objective for the PLA to be prepared for a Taiwan invasion by 2027.  China's deterrability is influenced by a variety of factors:

• The Chinese military has not participated in a significant conflict in the past 50 years, which is indicative of its lack of modern combat experience.
• Amphibious operations present logistical challenges for the PLA, as they must traverse 90 miles of ocean in order to invade Taiwan.
• Internal political instability – The removal of key military officials as a result of Xi's anti-corruption purges has disrupted leadership.
• China's nuclear posture is ambiguous but expanding.  Beijing's refusal to participate in arms control negotiations, which are anticipated to increase from 600 to 1,000 by 2030, contributes to strategic ambiguity.

China has also intensified its military cooperation with Russia, conducting joint naval and aviation exercises that have prompted apprehension in Japan and South Korea.  The analysts contend that these exercises are still coordinated displays of force, rather than advanced strategic maneuvers, despite the fact that these operations indicate a strengthening of military ties between Beijing and Moscow.

In the future, Taiwan must fortify its global alliances, expedite defense initiatives, and maintain resilience in the face of hybrid threats.  Although an imminent Chinese invasion is improbable, Taiwan's sovereignty will be secure in the future if it can deter aggression and maintain strategic partnerships.  Taiwan's future stability and security will be significantly influenced by a comprehensive defense strategy that encompasses military readiness, cyber resilience, and research security.